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Due to imperfect transparency and costly auditing, trust is an essential component of 
financial intermediation. In this paper we study a comprehensive sample of due diligence 
reports from a major hedge fund due diligence firm. A routine feature of due diligence is 
an assessment of integrity. We find that misrepresentation about past legal and regulatory 
problems is frequent (21%), as is incorrect or unverifiable representations about other 
topics (28%). Misrepresentation, the failure to use a major auditing firm and the use of 
internal pricing are significantly related to legal and regulatory problems, indices of 
operational risk. Due diligence (DD) reports are costly and are only performed when a 
fund is seriously considered for investment. It is important to control for this conditioning 
which would otherwise bias cross-sectional analysis. We find that DD reports are 
typically issued on high return funds three months after the historical performance has 
peaked. DD reports are also issued at the point of highest cash flow into the fund.  This 
pattern is consistent with return chasing behavior by institutional hedge fund investors.  
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“The positive proposition that increasing the integrity of a firm will 
contribute to increasing its value is no different in kind from the positive 
proposition that the net present value investment rule will lead to value 
creation.”-Michael Jensen2 
 
 
In the modern era of fund-based asset management, most investment decisions are 
delegated to agents whose behavior and character are imperfectly observed and known.  
Trust is thus an essential feature of the principal-agent relationship in the investment 
industry and integrity is an important factor in delegated fund management. A variety of 
institutions have developed to mediate the trust relationship, including regulators, 
independent auditors and service providers, third-party due diligence firms and informal 
word-of-mouth networks. Each time a manager “touches” one of these institutions, 
verifiable information is generated. The consistent or contradictory nature of this 
information has the potential to enhance or reduce the perceived trustworthiness of the 
manager. 
 The issue of trust is particularly important in the hedge fund industry. Hedge 
funds have only voluntary U.S. registration requirements, and because they are 
constrained from marketing to non-qualified investors, the amount of publicly available 
information available about their performance, strategies, organization, third-party 
relationships and personnel is limited to investors who review the fund offering 
memoranda. Hedge funds, particularly those that use proprietary trading models to 
generate returns, typically offer less information about their investment process than do 
other kinds of investment managers such as mutual funds. Although independent data 
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services such as TASS, HFR, and CISDM report such things as fund styles, leverage and 
fees, historical performance, and related advisor entities, they ultimately rely on the funds 
themselves to voluntarily provide this information.    
In part because the SEC does not allow hedge funds to engage in general 
solicitation, they have historically relied on trusted referrals as a prime distribution 
channel. This reliance on referrals, and the limited transparency with respect to 
performance and operations, are potential reasons why the Madoff scheme could last so 
long. Relatively few third party entities had access to performance statistics, information 
about firm auditors, pricing policies, self-administration and custody. In an environment 
lacking multiple, comparable sources of information about an agent’s credibility, trust is 
even more important, as are mechanisms to verify trustworthiness. 
 In this paper we analyze a comprehensive database of due diligence reports on 
hedge funds provided by a major investigation firm.  Due diligence (DD) firms specialize 
in gathering and verifying information potentially relevant to operational risk assessment.    
They are typically retained by clients who are considering an investment in a hedge fund, 
and who wish to gather more information beyond what is provided by the fund 
prospectus and by regulatory filings.3  While the academic literature has widely studied 
the roles of regulators, auditors and informal reputation within financial markets, research 
on third-party investigation is comparatively recent. For example, using essentially the 
same database, Cassar and Gerakos (2008) document correlation between hedge fund 
internal controls and manager fees, arguing that the extent of operational risk controls is 
endogenous. 
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The novel feature of the DD reports for our purpose is that they document factual 
misrepresentations and inconsistencies in statements and materials provided by hedge 
fund managers. The due diligence database employed in the current study allows us to 
address some basic questions about trust and credibility in the investment industry.  
First, how frequently do managers misreport to investigators about operational 
risk factors?  Although, as we shall discuss, the sample of firms subject to due diligence 
is endogenously determined by such issues as scale, past performance and risk concerns,  
the basic evidence in the DD records about the rates and nature of informational conflicts 
is sufficient to give investors serious cause for concern. We focus in particular on 
misrepresentations related to past regulatory and legal problems, and upon 
misrepresentations or verification problems relating to performance. The former is 
pertinent to the potential for future operational events, the latter is important because it is 
relevant to the trustworthiness of investor returns.  We find that both types of 
misrepresentation are common in the data. 
 The second question we investigate is whether informational contradictions 
matter to performance and risk.  In particular, we ask whether variables related to honesty 
explain past and future reported returns, and also whether they explain the probability of 
fund failure. This question is complicated by the obvious problem that if managers lie 
about performance, then their reported returns may not be a trustworthy basis for 
assessing their ex post or ex ante performance.  Considering the empirical results at face 
value, it would appear that informational conflicts on the DD forms are associated with 
higher future returns. Furthermore we find that verification problems increase the 
probability of fund failure.  
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Finally, we ask how the DD process relates to other institutional filters on 
operational risk. The most striking result we find is that the failure to use a Big 4 
accounting firm is a consistent indicator of factors associated with operational risk, 
including self-pricing of securities. 
 To address these questions, we control for a major conditioning variable: the 
selection of the fund for DD investigation. Because investors commission the DD reports, 
several factors are endogenous, including past performance and past legal or regulatory 
problems. For example a hedge fund with a stellar historical record might also have a 
history of regulatory problems which would motivate a fiduciary to more thoroughly vet 
the manager. In controlling for sample selection we estimate a model that explains the 
decision to undertake the DD process. This allows us to draw unbiased inferences about 
performance differentials between problem and non-problem funds. Additionally, the 
selection model is interesting in its own right, as it provides additional insight into the 
determinants of hedge funds flows.   
An event study shows that the DD reports are typically issued on high return 
funds three months after the historical performance has peaked. The DD reports are also 
issued at the point of highest investor flow into the fund.  This pattern is consistent with 
return chasing behavior by institutional hedge fund investors. Brown et al. (2008) found 
no evidence that knowledge of operational risk in any way mediated the fund flow 
performance relation. In this paper, we find some limited evidence that transparency of 
operations enhances fund flow, where transparency is measured by the extent to which 
management voluntarily discloses all prior problems and correctly respond to questions 
that are raised in the due diligence process.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we 
describe the data. In section III we report the determinants of funds selected for due 
diligence and address the selection bias issue. Section IV presents our main results on 
operational risk analysis, manager integrity, fund performance, and investor flows.  
Section V concludes. 
 
II. Data 
Our sample consists of 444 due diligence reports compiled by 
HedgeFundDueDiligence.com, a third party hedge fund due diligence service provider4. 
These funds are managed by 403 different advisors over the period 2003 to 2008.  The 
DD report information is gathered by the company through several channels: the offering 
document and marketing materials provided by the manager, on site interviews with the 
manager, and forms filled out by the manager. They augment this by verifying 
operational controls, assets under management, and performance with the administrator.  
Finally, they attempt to verify the authenticity of the audit with the auditor and perform a 
background check on the management company and its key staff. 
A typical DD report spans between 100 to 200 pages with both quantitative and 
qualitative sections prepared for the clients. Conventional databases such as TASS, HFR, 
or CISDM usually provide fund level information such as strategy, performance, assets, 
fees, and leverage, but they do not document the investment and operational process. In 
contrast, the DD reports reveal how portfolio values are determined, where day-to-day 
accounting is done, how the DD firm verifies the accuracy of the data provided, and how 
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the governance and control processes are conducted. As a result, DD reports provide a 
natural platform for us to study operational risk – a major factor in hedge fund failures.5 
By hand collecting data from the DD reports, we create 50 variables for our analysis, 
although not all data is available for all funds.6 Data definitions for these variables are 
reported in Appendix A.  
We supplement the information collected by the DD company with data from a 
combined TASS/CISDM dataset. These two datasets are matched via names and other 
characteristics. If a fund exists in both CISDM and TASS, we default to the characteristic 
and return data provided in TASS. As of March 2009, TASS has a total of 12,656 funds 
and CISDM has 13,171 funds, both live and defunct funds. We are able to match 5,879 
TASS funds and CISDM funds, which leaves us a combined hedge fund database of 
19,948 funds. Our analyses focus on fields that overlap between both datasets. We use 
the style definitions utilized by Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2008) for our combined 
dataset. Using this matched dataset, we then match the DD funds via fund names. If we 
are able to match a DD fund to our TASS/CISDM merged dataset, we rely on the 
performance information in the TASS/CISDM database for our performance and flow 
analyses. 
In addition to the specific funds that investors requested the DD company to 
investigate, some advisors also manage other hedge funds besides those in the DD 
dataset.  These funds are listed in the same DD report, along with information indicating 
if they are offshore, onshore equivalents or part of the master feeder structure of the fund 
being investigated. In the cases where the “other” funds listed on the DD report are 
                                                 
5
 See Capco (2003). Brown et al. (2009) find that a measure of operational risk is more predictive of fund 
failure than is financial risk. 
6
 For example, most onshore hedge funds are limited partnerships, which do not have boards of directors. 
7 
 
distinct, we also add these funds to our sample when investigating performance or 
investor flows. Since these funds are being operated by the same managers they are 
arguably exposed to the same operational risks.7 On the other hand, in our analysis of 
fund flows, they may provide a less accurate measure of investor flow response to 
performance. 
We present summary statistics for the DD funds in Table I. 
 
<Insert Table I about here> 
 
Of particular interest are variables related to operational issues that were 
previously unavailable from other hedge fund data sources. One set of variables of 
interest is the method of pricing securities by the fund. Hedge funds that invest in 
infrequently traded or illiquid securities cannot rely solely on observed market prices for 
establishing the portfolio value of the fund.  In these cases, managers may supply their 
own estimates of the hard-to-value security price.  This method has obvious potential for 
operational risk or downright fraud, if employed by an untrustworthy manager.  If 
securities in the fund are priced either entirely or partially by the manager we set the 
“pricing” variable equal to 0; if priced completely externally it is equal to 1.  Another 
variable related to pricing is the NavRestate variable. This variable indicates whether the 
net asset value has been restated in the fund’s history and is a related indicator of the 
reliability of the pricing mechanism. 
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Another group of four variables evaluates the signature controls of the fund. Two 
variables indicate the number of signatures required to move money from a bank or the 
prime broker.  Generally, the more signatures required to move money from one location 
to another, the lower the operational risk. However, the number of signatures does not 
completely capture the security of cash accounts. A two signature requirement, while 
better than a single signature, may be of little value if both signatures are non-
independent. To supplement these measures, the DD company also indicates whether 
money movements are restricted to certain locations. For example, money movements 
from the prime broker may be limited to only the fund’s bank account. The final 
signature-related variable indicates whether the signature controls are of “institutional 
quality,” meeting the best practice standard for the institutional investment industry. The 
DD company defines institutional quality as all money movements requiring an internal 
and independent third party signature.8    
Two of the due diligence variables address personnel and governance: the number 
of staff departures from the fund and the number of fund board members who are 
independent.  The first of these relates to the risk involved when a position is vacated and 
know-how is lost, or continuity in oversight is compromised.  Higher personnel turnover 
taxes the attention of other members of the firm and is a common “red flag” for 
operational risk. The count of independent board members is a standard governance 
measure that equates independence with disincentive for fraud and lack of conflicts of 
interest. It has been shown to be a useful variable in studies of the mutual fund industry 
(see Cremers and Nair (2005)). In a practical sense, in the hedge fund universe, only 
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funds organized offshore tend to have directors.9  For both employee turnover and 
independent board members, there is the additional possibility that leaving a fund, or an 
unwillingness of an independent director to serve on a board is an indication of potential 
problems.  
The DD firm also reports whether the fund is audited by a Big 4 accounting firm. 
This variable is of particular interest because the fund “inherits” the positive reputation of 
the firm to the extent that the auditor issues an unqualified opinion with respect to the 
audited assets and valuation procedures.  In the aftermath of the Enron case that brought 
down a major accounting firm, the risks to the auditor of taking on an untrustworthy 
client are clearly evident. Thus, this simple variable is expected to carry considerable 
weight in separating funds with and without significant risk of fraud.10   Because of this 
liability, the auditing firm typically pre-screens managers for the potential risk they pose 
the firm before taking them as a client. This risk analysis continues after the firm is 
accepted as a client.11 Because of client confidentiality issue, audit firms are not a public 
source of information about manager operational risk.12   
 One key operational risk variable we use in our analysis is whether or not the fund 
has had a previous regulatory problem or has been involved in a lawsuit.  For a brief 
                                                 
9
 Only a hand full of onshore funds in our sample has boards of directors. Aragon, Liang, and Park (2009) 
indicate that most onshore funds are organized as partnership while most offshore funds are organize as 
open-end investment companies. 
10
 Liang (2003) indicates that hedge funds that employed Big 4 auditors tend to be large funds and have less 
reporting discrepancies. 
11
 From one of the DD reports: “… also stated that OneBig4Auditor performs extensive Due Diligence 
prior to accepting a new client.” 
12
 Auditors were unresponsive to all DD company questions except for the most basic requests for 
information. Most auditors, especially the ‘Big 4’ would not discuss any aspect of their audits with the DD 
company, even going as far in some cases as not to confirm the fund was a client of the company. This was 
regardless of whether or not the fund gave the auditor permission. In some circumstances, the DD company 
was able to obtain audits from either the administrator or the fund itself to help verify performance and 
asset information. However, without auditor verification, the DD company would be unable to verify the 
authenticity of the audit. 
10 
 
period in 2006 most U.S. based hedge funds were required to register with the SEC as 
investment advisors and file a Form ADV disclosure that provided operational details of 
the funds, including ownership details, evidence of external and internal conflicts of 
interest and legal and regulatory problems, along with other information.13 Brown et al. 
(2008) found that, among other things, problem funds had significantly more conflicts of 
interest compared to non-problem funds, suggesting that the potential for exploiting 
customers was associated with past adverse events.  Table I shows that that 41% of the 
funds in our sample have some form of legal or regulatory problem, more than twice the 
frequency of problems reported in the 2006 Form ADV filings (Brown et al. 2008). Of 
this number, 32% of the funds have been involved in legal disputes as defendants and 
15% of funds in the database have past regulatory problems. Firms with problems of this 
nature would be less inclined to reveal them publicly through registration. Unscrupulous 
managers might even misrepresent the extent of past problems to customers.  Fee-based 
due diligence service providers seek to capture this kind of misrepresentation through 
background research and direct interviews with managers. 
We use the DD forms to indicate whether managers indeed misrepresent past 
problems, or their past experiences. The DD firm compared the manager’s statement 
about past legal and regulatory events to third-party records and noted whether the 
manager’s account squared with the independent evidence. A manager who lied about his 
or her background also falls into this category. We further break this indicator down into 
misrepresentation about lawsuits vs. regulatory problems. We also have an indicator for 
whether the DD company could not verify other information provided by the manager, 
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for example discrepancies relating to operational issues such as the signatures required 
for fund transfer. The manager may report that the fund uses one procedure and the bank 
or broker may report that the fund uses another. The category Noted Verification Problem 
indicates that 42% of the funds in our sample had either a misrepresentation or an 
inconsistency problem. To further investigate the trustworthiness of these funds, we 
break these variables down further in Table Ia. Signature Disagreement indicates that in 
16% of the cases, the fund’s version of the signature process did not match the version 
explained by the administrator, while Pricing Disagreement indicates that 3.6% of the 
funds disagreed with the administrator on the process used to price the portfolio. Bad 
Recall indicates that in 21% of the cases, the manager verbally stated incorrect 
information to the DD company when check against written documentation. Asset 
Disagree and Performance Disagree indicate that 10% of the asset and 4.5% of the 
performance data disagreed between the fund and either the administrator or the auditor. 
Switched Vendor indicates that 11% of the funds switched a major data vendor in the last 
3 years, while Refused DD Question means that 14% of the funds or the administrator 
refused to answer DD company questions. Finally, Can’t Verify Assets and Can’t Verify 
Performance indicate that the DD company is unable to verify the fund’s assets for 8% of 
the funds or performance information for 9% of the funds, respectively. 
 
<Insert Table Ia about here> 
 
In the wake of the Madoff scandal, verifying performance and existence of assets 
has taken on greater importance. Surprisingly, nearly 19% of funds’ asset information 
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either could not be verified independently (Assets Disagree) or the DD firm found a 
disagreement between the fund’s reported assets and evidence from an alternative source 
(Can’t Verify Assets).  Similar discrepencies (Performance Disagree) or verification 
problems (Can’t Verify Performance) with respect to reported performance were noted 
for 14% of DD investigations. The DD firm also found that 20% of managers (Bad 
Recall) interviewed had poor recollection about basic levels of assets and performance. 
For example, one manager’s verbal assets under management figure were over $300 
million higher than the actual number.  
We found it useful to rank managers on how forthcoming they were concerning 
past problems. We considered three cases. In the first case, managers voluntary disclosed 
a past problem; however, after further investigation, the DD company found additional 
legal or regulatory items that should have been disclosed. This occurred in 6% of the 
cases. We label these managers “strategic liars” in table Ia. In the second case, managers 
disclosed no past problems, but the DD company found they had past legal or regulatory 
problems.  This occurred 9% of the time. We simply label this group of managers “liars.” 
Finally, if a fund disclosed past problems and the DD company found these were all of 
the problems with no additional misrepresentations concerning their backgrounds, we 
labeled these managers “truth-tellers” (23%).  A final category is the group of managers 
who had no past legal or regulatory problems to disclose. It is remarkable that 15% of 
funds intentionally or unintentionally told some category of lies to the DD company even 
when they knew that the company was hired to verify this information. 
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To investigate the relationship between funds’ operational properties and past 
problems, we separate out the problem funds (i.e. those that have experienced legal and 
regulatory problems) and report univariate means and differences in Table II.  
 
<Insert Table II about here> 
 
We find little difference in the performance of the two groups. Problem funds tend to be 
larger than non-problem funds, which may be a function of larger funds having more 
opportunities for lawsuits. This is consistent with Brown et al. (2008). We do find non-
problem funds have some better operating controls. Non-problem funds more frequently 
use independent pricing procedures than do problem funds, although problem funds are 
also more illiquid (measured by longer lockup and redemption periods) and therefore 
may have to rely on internal pricing. Non-problem funds also have Big 4 auditors more 
often as well as lower levels of noted verification problems. However, there are few 
differences in the signature setups between the two groups. The Big 4 auditor variable is 
particularly interesting in light of the practice of auditors “pre-screening” clients through 
their own due diligence process. Finally, the problem funds are more likely to switch data 
vendors, perhaps because irregularities may have been discovered by the previous 
vendor. 
 
III. Determinants of Fund Selection 
Our univariate results indicate that problem funds are more likely to have poorer 
operational controls while problem funds have similar performance to non-problem 
14 
 
funds. However, one confounding aspect in any empirical analysis is the potential for 
selection bias. Unlike the TASS/CISDM database which comprises thousands of hedge 
funds, the DD company surveyed only approximately 450 hedge funds at the specific 
request of a potential or current investor in each fund. Previous research has found 
investors are more likely to invest in hedge funds that have certain characteristics such as 
higher historical performance.14 Investors may also be more likely to request a DD report 
when they do not trust self-reported measures of historical performance. For these 
reasons, funds in our DD sample may not represent a random sample of funds from the 
entire hedge fund universe.  
 We examine this selection issue in the following manner. Using our combined 
TASS/CISDM database, we create a list of hedge funds available to be selected each year 
based on characteristic and performance data ending the previous calendar year. For 
example, in 2003, any hedge fund alive during the second half of 2002 with the relevant 
characteristic and performance data is included in our sample. We then label funds 
selected for a DD report in the following year with a “1” while funds not selected are 
labeled with a “0”. We create a data panel extending from 2003 to 2008, which we then 
use to run a logistic regression predicting which funds are selected based on their 
characteristics.  
We include prior performance (Return Mean), prior risk (Return Standard 
Deviation), return autocorrelation (Ret Autocorrelation) size (Log Assets), fees and share 
restriction measures. We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the fund has a 
Big 4 auditor as indicated in TASS/CISDM. While we do not have background checks on 
all funds in TASS/CISDM, we utilize the Big 4 auditor flag to proxy for a lack of past 
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problems, due to indications that the Big 4 auditors screen potential clients. We fit for the 
case of funds selected for a DD report so positive coefficients indicate a fund with those 
characteristics is more likely to be chosen for a DD report. We run two models. One 
model only examines the selection of the DD funds where we were able to match that DD 
fund with our combined TASS/CISDM. The other model includes funds that we were 
unable to match. We used data from the DD reports to populate the necessarily fields for 
these funds to be included in the selection model. While these funds could not have been 
selected solely from TASS/CISDM due to their lack of inclusion in those datasets, these 
funds had to be known by the individuals requesting the DD reports and therefore it 
seems reasonable to include them in the analysis. We include style and year dummies as 
well as clustered standard errors by fund. The results are reported in Table III 
 
<Insert Table III about here> 
 
 As one would expect, larger funds with better prior performance are more likely to 
be selected. Larger funds have more clients and higher visibility, which increases the 
likelihood one would select the fund for a report. As Ding et al. (2008) find, funds with 
superior past performance are more likely to receive attention from potential investors. 
We also find that funds with Big 4 auditors are less likely to be selected. If it is perceived 
that problem funds are less likely to have Big 4 auditors, this fact alone may be a 
sufficient “red flag” to require the services of a DD company before investing in such a 
fund. An alternative interpretation is that investors are more comfortable if a fund has a 
well-known auditor due to their reliance on the auditor’s opinion with respect to 
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operational risk. Major fraud cases, such as Bayou and Madoff, involved smaller, 
unknown auditors.  Funds with higher incentive fees and those with a high water mark 
provision are more likely to be selected, as these variables are likely to reflect manager 
quality.15 The selection model results are consistent whether or not we include the 
unmatched DD funds. Consistent with prior findings16, these selection results suggest 
investors chase past returns. 
We also examine performance and flows to the DD funds around the DD report 
date. Each month we compute monthly flow for all funds, which is the difference 
between this month’s assets and last month’s assets adjusted for this month’s 
performance divided by the prior month’s assets. We then compute the median of all 
funds’ monthly flows by the number of months that flow occurred from the report date. 
We do the same for monthly returns. We report median values from two years prior to the 
report date to two years after the report date with zero being the report month. Figure 1 
displays results for monthly returns while Figure 2 displays results for monthly flows. 
 
<Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here> 
 
Both flows and returns peak slightly before the funds had a DD report. If one 
were to include a lag from the time that the fund was selected by the investor for a DD 
report and the report date, investors are selecting funds, on average, exactly at the peak of 
their performance and investor flows. The two graphs also nicely show how flows lag 
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performance by approximately 6 to 8 months, consistent with the evidence that investors 
chase past performance 
In additional to the selection bias concerning which funds get selected for the DD 
reports from the entire hedge fund universe, the DD funds that choose to list in major 
databases may be significantly different from funds that choose to not report. We 
compare the DD funds listed in CISDM/TASS and funds that were not listed. Results are 
presented in Table IV. 
 
<Insert Table IV about here> 
 
Interestingly, there are almost no differences between the two groups. The only 
significant difference lies in the autocorrelation of returns. All other performance, 
operating and truthfulness variables are not significantly different. These results, 
however, are conditional on funds being selected for analysis.17 
 
IV. Results on Operational Risk 
A. Relationship between Operational Risk and Problems and Misrepresentations 
Potential hedge fund investors must decide whether to trust managers with their 
money. An important question for investors is whether the operational controls of the 
fund compensate for any potential historical breaches of trust. For example, if managers 
have a history of legal or regulatory problems then strong operational controls, such as a 
Big 4 auditor or external pricing, may alleviant investors’ concerns. In addition, if a 
relationship between problems and operational controls exists, then simply having 
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information about the background history of the managers may provide investors with 
some comfort regarding the funds’ operational controls. 
To test these propositions, we examine the relationship between past regulatory or 
legal problems and operational controls using a logistic model. We control for selection 
bias by performing the analysis using the two-stage Heckman (1979) model. The lambda 
term represents the selection control variable from the first stage regression. The second 
stage logistic model utilizes advisor information to cluster standard errors and also 
includes style dummies. We fit for the one case; thus, positive coefficients indicate a 
higher likelihood of problems. Results are reported in Table V.  
 
<Insert Table V about here> 
 
 We find that funds with legal and regulatory problems have poor operational 
controls. Problem funds are less likely to have independent pricing. We also find problem 
funds are more likely to have switched vendors in the last 3 years. While changing 
vendors to upgrade the quality of pricing or trade execution is positive for investors, 
changing vendors may also be a red flag as the fund may have been dropped by the 
vendor. Finally, problem funds are less likely to have a Big 4 auditor; although this result 
is consistent with Big 4 auditors avoiding funds with legal or regulatory issues. This 
evidence is consistent with Brown et al. (2008) who find that operational risk (measured 
by the probability of having problems) is positively associated with conflict of interest 
and concentrated ownership problems. We would expect that having a Big 4 auditor and 
independent pricing would be negatively associated with conflicts of interest. 
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 One potential drawback of using background information on managers is the 
reliability of this information, especially if it is self-reported. Indeed, we find 
approximately 20% of funds have managers who misrepresented past problems or their 
background information. 10% of funds would have been classified as non-problem funds 
based on the information disclosed voluntarily to the DD company and through any 
precompiled due diligence questionnaires, but were found to be problem funds after 
background checks by the DD company. An important question is whether any 
indications exist that would flag investors about potential misrepresentations. 
 We perform an analysis of misrepresentations similar to the prior analysis 
performed on problems. We run a logistic regression on the misrepresentation variable, 
where 1 indicates a fund misrepresented itself. We fit for the one case; hence positive 
coefficients indicate a higher likelihood the fund misrepresented something to the DD 
firm. We include the same independent variables as in Table V and conduct the 
econometric analysis in the same manner. Results for two different specifications are 
presented in Table VI. 
 
<Insert Table VI about here> 
  
 While strong relationships between problems and operational controls exist, 
identifying misrepresentations without a professional third party evaluation is much more 
challenging. The only indication that a fund may be misrepresenting itself is the lack of a 
Big 4 auditor. This relationship may again by due to the Big 4 auditor’s prescreening 
clients. Liars are less likely to have Big 4 auditors. 
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B. Relationship between Operational Controls and Performance 
Results in the prior section find a relationship between operational risk and 
problems, which is similar to previous results found by Brown et al. (2008, 2009) on 
hedge fund operational risk. While those studies examined the relationship between 
operational risk and potential conflicts of interest, the collected due diligence data 
provides the opportunity to examine other potential operational risks for investors. In 
light of Ponzi scheme scandals in the hedge fund area, one issue of great interest is 
whether reported returns fairly represent investor performance. Prior research on hedge 
fund performance has identified evidence that some hedge fund managers may game their 
performance.18  
 We first examine the performance reported by the hedge funds in our due 
diligence sample prior to the DD report date. For each fund in our sample, we compute 
the appraisal ratio using the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factor model.19 We regress this 
performance measure on several independent variables, focusing on the relationship 
between two sets of variables. The first set is comprised of variables that indicate the 
truthfulness of fund management during the DD process. As previously defined, 
managers who voluntary disclosed some but not all of their past problems are defined as 
“strategic liars.” Managers who disclosed none of their past problems are labeled “liars.” 
Finally, managers who disclose all (if any) of their past problems are labeled “truth-
                                                 
18
 For example, Bollen and Pool (2009) find a discontinuity in the distribution of hedge fund returns. 
Getmansky et al. (2004) find significant autocorrelation of hedge fund returns while Agarwal et al. (2008) 
find hedge funds’ December returns appear artificially high. 
19
 We thank David Hsieh for making this data available at his website. See 
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFData.htm. 
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tellers.” The second set of variables of interest is the operational controls, including the 
pricing mechanism, Big 4 auditor indicator, verification problems and so forth. 
 We regress fund appraisal ratios against these variables as well as other control 
variables relevant to performance, such as fund size, age and style dummies. As before, 
we use a two-stage Heckman model to control for the selection bias found previously.20 
We also compute standard errors and t-statistics using clustered standard errors by 
advisor since we have overlap across advisors. We include both the DD funds and the 
other funds listed on the DD reports, perform the analysis using three different sets of 
independent variables, and report results in Table VII. 
 
<Insert Table VII about here> 
 
While we find no relationship between risk-adjusted performance and measures of 
truthfulness, we do find funds with a Big 4 auditor have lower appraisal ratios than funds 
with non-Big 4 auditors even after controlling for style, size and age. While funds 
without Big 4 auditors may indeed be better performers, an alternative explanation for 
these findings is that the returns reported by firms without Big 4 auditors may not be 
trustworthy. Small and young funds perform better due to mangers’ desire to establish 
their track records while the positive coefficient on “notice period” may indicate a 
liquidity premium.21 
                                                 
20
 In our previous results, we found performance prior to the DD report was a factor in the selection of 
funds. Including performance as a factor in the first stage regression and then examining performance in the 
second stage model causes a large spurious loading on the lambda variable. Thus, we omit performance 
related variables from the first stage regression for the examination of prior performance only. Our results 
therefore may be confounded by the selection bias, even when using the Heckman procedure.   
21
 See Chevalier and Ellison (1998) and Aragon (2007), respectively. 
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We next examine the performance of funds after their DD report date. Again, for 
each fund we compute their appraisal ratio using the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factor 
model. The empirical setup is identical to the prior results on prior performance, except 
for the inclusive of performance related variables in the first stage of the Heckman 
procedure. We also use the same three sets of independent variables and report results in 
Table VIII. 
<Insert Table VIII about here> 
 
Funds that strategically lie on their DD reports have higher performance than 
other funds after the DD report. As with the auditor result in the prior analysis, perhaps 
these funds are better funds. However, since these managers appear to only strategically 
lie to the DD company, they may also choose to “game” the return data reported to 
investors, which causes these funds to appear superior to their peers.22 We also find funds 
that have external pricing have lower performance than funds that price their own 
portfolios. Non-independent pricing allows the opportunity to inflate performance 
through “cherry picking” of model prices or outright fraud.23 Overall, these results raise 
the question of whether performance reported by some hedge funds may not reflect the 
truth. 
 
C. Relationship between Fund Termination and Operational Risk 
                                                 
22
 Given that hedge funds may not engage in general solicitation, performance data reported to hedge fund 
databases is one of the few ways funds can make themselves known to investors. Reported returns may 
differ from the actual returns to fund investors. For example, according to the Wall Street Journal, NIR 
Group was investigated for telling investors the performance of the fund was high, while then telling 
investors their shares were “worthless” when trying to redeem. See 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124840478374278275.html. 
23
 Alternatively, internal pricing may be related to hard-to-price illiquid securities, as indicated by the 
positive coefficient on Notice period, which can serve as an indicator for liquidity premium. 
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Thus far, we have established a relationship between operational risk and past 
regulatory and legal problems and have found relationships between operational risk 
variables and fund performance. While managers with low quality operational procedures 
may be able to smooth performance, ultimately this behavior may have little long-term 
effect on the performance outcome for investors. However, if a manager is committing a 
serious breach of fiduciary duty which causes fund closure, this could lead to substantial 
loss or inconvenience. In addition, artificially high performance could attract more flows 
from other investors, allowing such things as performance smoothing or allowing 
fraudulent Ponzi schemes to continue over long periods. 
In Table IX, we examine the relationship between fund “death” and operational 
risk variables and other fund characteristics to determine whether operational risk affects 
the probability of fund death.  For our purpose, fund death is defined as the cessation of 
the fund reporting to the database. We run a Cox proportional hazards model controlling 
for right-censoring. As with the other models, we include the Heckman lambda to control 
for selection bias.  
 
<Insert Table IX about here> 
 
Our results indicate that funds where performance or asset data could not be 
verified along with a misrepresentation are more likely to fail. Brown et al. (2009) argue 
that operational risk is more predictive of fund failure than is financial risk. Indeed, in our 
sample return standard deviation is inversely related to fund failure. This is consistent 
with the view that firms which engage in return smoothing behavior are most likely to 
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fail. While the coefficient on the signature institutional quality variable is opposite of 
what would be expected, not all hedge funds stop reporting to databases due to poor 
performance. Hence, funds with high quality signature processes are most likely larger 
and may stop voluntarily reporting instead of actually terminating. 
 
D. Relationship between Future Flows and Operational Risk 
While our analysis has found information about truthfulness and operational risk 
relevant, whether investors utilize this information to its fullest is unknown. Some 
individuals refused to invest with Madoff due to operational concerns. However, others 
continued to provide money even when they understood his operational deficiencies.24 
Prior research has shown no relationship between investor flows and operational risk 
disclosed by hedge funds during the brief period of mandatory disclosure by the SEC.25 
However, it was unclear whether investors did not know about the operational risk 
characteristics of the funds they invested in, or whether they had full information but 
simply chose to ignore operational risk concerns. While the DD reports are only prepared 
for one investor, the information will clearly be known to one party either interested in 
investing or already invested in the fund.26 In addition, the information from the DD 
report may also filter through third-party channels and become “public” information to 
the investment community.  
                                                 
24
 For example, the $17Billion fund (according to the Madoff SEC Form ADV filing) was audited not by a 
Big 4 firm but rather by David Friehling, a strip mall accountant who has since pleaded guilty to charges 
stemming from his role in the affair. 
25
 See Brown et al. (2008). 
26
 One investor can represent a large portion of a fund’s overall assets. The DD reports give information on 
funds’ largest investors, who on average represent 21% of funds’ assets. 
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We examine investor reaction to the DD reports by examining investor flows for 
the twelve months immediately after the DD report dates. Flows are computed as in Sirri 
and Tufano (1998). Models include style dummies as well as the lambda term from the 
Heckman procedure. Errors are clustered on the advisor variable and our independent 
variables are the same variables used in prior analyses. We report results for three models 
in Table X on our DD fund sample combined with the other funds listed on the DD 
report. 
 
<Insert Table X about here> 
 
Consistent with the results reported in Brown et al. (2008) we find little 
relationship between operational risk or the truthfulness of DD companies and investor 
flows. Only the Bad Recall variable, which represents verbal inconsistencies from the 
management, is significantly negative. However, one confounding issue is that we are 
including both the DD funds and the other funds listed on the DD report in this analysis. 
While we know an investor is interested in the DD fund itself and thus we may be able to 
observe a reaction in the flow variable, the same does not hold for the other funds listed 
on the DD report. Thus, we run the same analysis but only on DD funds themselves. 
Results are reported in Table XI. 
 
<Insert Table XI about here> 
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Unlike the previous results, we now find some limited evidence that transparency 
can lead to higher fund flow. Funds that voluntarily disclosed all of their prior problems 
have higher flows, and funds for which it was difficult to reconcile manager statements 
with other information experience lower flows. This is consistent with a view that 
investors are more likely to invest with a manager who is truthful. Of course, successful 
managers have less incentive to misrepresent their record, and so it is not clear whether 
the fund flow is reacting to truthfulness or to the general perception that the manager is 
successful.  
 As a final exercise on investor reaction to the DD reports, we investigate the level 
of flows directed toward the DD funds after the DD reports versus funds with similar 
size, age and performance in the same style prior to the DD report date. On the one hand, 
we know investors are interested in these funds; thus the DD funds should have higher 
levels of flows. However, all DD reports find some level of red flags. These red flags, 
even if minor especially if the DD reports are being performed on funds that investors are 
particularly concerned about, may deter investment. We report results comparing flows 
of the DD funds to the matched funds in Table XII. 
 
<Insert Table XII about here> 
 
 We find that the DD funds do have higher investor flows after the DD reports. 
Thus, most investors must still feel comfortable enough to invest in these funds, even 
after reading about funds’ operational deficiencies. Investors may use the DD report as 
one of the screening criteria, together with their own information and connections.  
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V. Conclusion 
Using hand-collected proprietary hedge fund due diligence (DD) data, we study 
operational risk, manager integrity, hedge fund performance and investor flows. Despite 
the fundamental importance of integrity in the delegated asset management business, we 
find that incomplete and inaccurate disclosure of important information is not uncommon 
among a sample of funds selected for research by clients of a major due diligence firm.   
The sample selection issues with respect to the database are themselves revealing.  The 
DD reports are commissioned for funds with high past performance, and this 
performance peaks around the time of the report, consistent with a reversion towards the 
mean.  The same is true for investor flows, albeit with a lag.  Focusing on funds of 
interest to investors, we find some evidence that truthtelling is rewarded by investor 
flows.  This is consistent with the unsurprising hypothesis that investors value managerial 
integrity.  It is also consistent with the view that successful managers who are able to 
attract funds find little incentive to misrepresent their past history. In prior work, we had 
hypothesized an important role for private-sector information providers in the hedge fund 
industry. The current study allows us to study the private-sector mechanism in depth 
using a key subsample for which information gathering was extremely costly, and was 
evidently of some value to the investor.   
Some of our results were to be expected. We find that funds with legal or 
regulatory problems are less trustworthy. We also found that the relationship with a major 
auditing firm was a sufficient statistic for the tendency to tell the truth. This is 
particularly important as we find that misrepresentation of pertinent facts is a leading 
28 
 
indicator of future fund failure. This strongly suggests that the role of the auditing firm is 
an important one in the market for investment services, especially hedge funds and other 
service providers that are lightly regulated. 
  
  
29 
 
REFERENCES 
Agarwal, Vikas, Naveen D. Daniel, and Narayan Y. Naik, 2006, Flows, Performance, and 
Managerial Incentives in the Hedge Fund Industry, Working paper, London Business 
School. 
 
Agarwal, V., N. D. Daniel, and N. Y. Naik, 2008, “Why Is Santa So Kind to Hedge 
Funds? The December Return Puzzle!”London Business School Working Paper.  
 
Aragon, G. O., 2007, “Share Restrictions and Asset Pricing: Evidence from the Hedge 
Fund Industry,” Journal of Financial Economics 83, 33-58. 
 
Aragon, G. O., B. Liang, and H. Park, 2009, “Liquidity Premium: Evidence from 
Onshore and Offshore Hedge Funds,” University of Massachusetts working paper. 
 
Bollen, N. P.B. and V. K. Pool, 2009, “Do Hedge Fund Managers Misreport Returns? 
Evidence from the Pooled Distribution,” Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
 
Brown, S. J., W. N. Goetzmann, B. Liang, and C. Schwarz, 2008, “Mandatory Disclosure 
and Operational Risk:  Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration” Journal of Finance 63, 
2785-2815. 
 
Brown, S. J., W. N. Goetzmann, B. Liang, and C. Schwarz, 2009, “Estimating 
Operational Risk for Hedge Funds: The ɷ Score” Financial Analysts Journal 65, 43-53. 
 
Brown, S. J., T. Fraser, and B. Liang, 2008, “Hedge Fund Due Diligence: A Source of 
Alpha in a Hedge Fund Portfolio Strategy,” Journal of Investment Management 6, 23-33. 
 
Capco, 2003, “Understanding and Mitigating Operational Risk in Hedge Fund 
Investments,” A Capco White Paper. 
 
Cassar, G. and J. Gerakos, 2008, “Determinants of Hedge Fund Internal Controls and 
Fees,” University of Pennsylvania and University of Chicago Working Paper.  
 
Chevalier, J. and G. Ellison, 1999, “Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 389-432. 
 
Cremers, K. J. M., Nair, V., 2005, “Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices,” The 
Journal of Finance, 60(6), 2859-2875. 
 
Ding, B., M. Getmansky, B. Liang, and R. Wermers, 2008, “Investor Flows and Share 
Restrictions in the Hedge Fund Industry,” Working Paper, University of Massachusetts. 
 
Cremers, K.J. M., J. Driessen, P. Maenhout, D. Weinbaum, 2005, “Does Skin in the 
Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry,” 
Working Paper, Yale School of Management. 
30 
 
 
Fung, W. and D. Hsieh, 2004, "Hedge Fund Benchmarks: A Risk Based Approach," 
Financial Analyst Journal, 60, 65-80. 
 
Fung, W. and D. Hsieh, 2002, “Benchmarks of Hedge Fund Performance: Information 
Content and Measurement Biases,” Financial Analysts Journal, 58, 22-34. 
 
Fung, W. and D. Hsieh, 2000, “Performance Characteristics of Hedge Funds and CTA 
Funds: Natural Versus Spurious Biases,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
35, 291-307. 
 
Getmansky, M., Lo, A. W., and I. Makarov, 2004, “An Econometric Model of Serial 
Correlation and Illiquidity in Hedge Fund Returns,” Journal of Financial Economics, 
74(3), 529-609. 
 
Heckman, J., 1979, "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error", Econometrica, 47 
(1), 153-161. 
 
Jensen, M. J., 2009, “Putting Integrity into Finance Theory and Practice: A Positive 
Approach.” Harvard Business School Working Paper.  
 
Liang, B., 2003, “The Accuracy of Hedge Fund Returns,” Journal of Portfolio 
Management 29, 111-122, 
 
Liang, K and S. Zeger, 1986, “Longitudinal data analysis using generalized linear 
models,” Biometrika, 73(1), 13-22. 
 
Newey, W. and K. West, 1987, “A Simple Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity 
and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix,” Econometrica, 55, 703-708. 
 
Sirri, E. and P. Tufano, 1998, “Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows,” The Journal of 
Finance, 53(5), 1589-1622. 
  
31 
 
Table I:  Basic Statistics 
 
Data is from a due diligence company. There are 444 funds. All data are hand-collected. Data 
definitions are reported in Appendix A.  
 
Performance N Mean Std dev Min Max 
Avg. Returns 419 1.67 1.18 -1.97 9.73 
Return Std. Dev. 417 2.37 1.82 0.01 12.40 
Autocorrelation 393 0.15 0.23 -0.55 0.78 
Appraisal Ratio 336 1.05 2.33 -0.61 37.49 
Fund Properties      
Management fee (%) 441 1.54 0.48 0.00 3.5 
Incentive fee (%) 440 19.13 4.50 0.00 50.00 
High Water Mark 439 0.97 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Redemption period 441 72.25 74.97 1.00 730.00 
Lockup period 441 97.01 199.15 0.00 2000.00 
Notice period 442 50.36 35.84 1.00 365.00 
Time to get cash 421 20.26 16.09 0.00 120.00 
Holding Period 396 0.75 0.79 0.00 5.50 
AUM (Millions of $) 441 380.62 861.55 0.00 8000.00 
Manager Characteristics      
Manager age 379 44.18 8.98 27.00 79.00 
Manager experience 375 18.79 7.97 1.00 50.00 
Manager degree 379 0.65 0.65 0.00 2.00 
Manager property 260 1.67 3.33 0.00 32.00 
Operations      
Pricing 443 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Signature: bank 404 1.70 0.71 0.00 4.00 
Signature: prime broker 391 1.74 0.73 0.00 5.00 
Signature: IQ  438 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Big4Auditor 443 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Money Restrictions 384 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Transparency 442 1.43 0.69 0.00 2.00 
NAV restate 442 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Staff departure 437 0.49 0.95 0.00 7.00 
% of board Ind. 338 0.45 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Background Issues      
Problem 443 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Lawsuit 443 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Regulatory 443 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Misrepresentation 443 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Inconsistency 443 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Noted Ver Problem 443 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
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Table Ia: Univariate Information on Verification Problems 
 
Data is from a due diligence company. There are 444 funds. All data are hand-collected. Data 
definitions are reported in Appendix A.  
 
Verification Problems N Mean Std dev Min Max 
Signature Disagreement 443 16.03% 36. 73% 0 1 
Pricing Disagreement 443 3.60% 18.68% 0 1 
Bad Recall 443 20.99% 40.77% 0 1 
Assets Disagree 443 10.38% 30.54% 0 1 
Performance Disagree 442 4.52% 20.81% 0 1 
Switched Vendor 443 11.51% 31.95% 0 1 
Refused DD question 443 14.00% 34.73% 0 1 
Can't Verify Assets 443 8.13% 27.35% 0 1 
Can't Verify Performance 443 9.03% 28.69% 0 1 
      
Lying Information N Mean Std dev Min Max 
Strategic Liar 443 6.32% 24.36% 0 1 
Liar 443 9.26% 29.01% 0 1 
Truthteller 443 23.48% 42.43% 0 1 
      
Regulatory Lie 443 6.32% 24.36% 0 1 
Lawsuit Lie 443 17.38% 37.94% 0 1 
Legal Lie 443 2.26% 14.87% 0 1 
Background Lie 443 5.87% 23.53% 0 1 
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Table II:  Problem and Non-problem Funds Compared 
 
Data is from a due diligence company. There are 444 funds. All data are hand-collected. Data 
definitions are reported in Appendix A. Problem funds are those funds that have either a 
regulatory issue or a lawsuit discussed on the DD report. The difference is the non-problem 
mean minus the problem mean. The significance of the difference is assessed using a t-test.  
 
 Non-Problem Problem   
Performance N Mean N Mean Diff  
Avg. Returns 242 1.65 177 1.70 -0.05 
Return Std. Dev. 240 2.29 177 2.47 -0.18 
Autocorrelation 227 0.14 166 0.15 -0.01 
Appraisal Ratio 198 0.95 138 1.20 -0.25 
Fund Properties      
Management fee (%) 258 1.57 183 1.50 0.07 
Incentive fee (%) 259 19.19 182 19.05 0.14 
High Water Mark 256 0.98 183 0.96 0.02 
Redemption period (days) 260 64.41 181 83.51 -19.10* 
Lockup period (days) 260 76.77 181 126.08 -49.31* 
Notice period (days) 260 47.65 182 54.23 -6.58 
Time to get cash (days) 246 19.40 175 21.47 -2.07 
Holding Period (years) 230 0.68 166 0.84 -0.16 
AUM (Millions of $) 260 282.12 181 522.11 -239.99* 
Operations      
Pricing 260 0.72 183 0.54 0.28** 
Signature: bank 242 1.65 162 1.78 -0.13 
Signature: prime broker 230 1.70 162 1.79 -0.09 
Signature: IQ  256 0.26 182 0.25 0.01 
Big4Auditor 260 0.70 183 0.52 0.18** 
Money Restrictions 221 0.40 163 0.34 0.06 
Transparency 259 1.42 183 1.43 -0.01 
NAV restate 259 0.10 183 0.10 0.00 
Staff departure 258 0.42 179 0.58 -0.16 
% of board Ind. 214 0.47 124 0.43 0.04 
Background Issues      
Misrepresentation 260 0.10 183 0.38 -0.28** 
Inconsistency 260 0.27 183 0.30 -0.03 
Noted Ver Problem 260 0.34 183 0.54 -0.20** 
Signature Disagreement 260 0.17 183 0.15 0.02 
Pricing Disagreement 260 0.04 183 0.03 0.01 
Bad Recall 260 0.20 183 0.22 -0.02 
Assets Disagree 260 0.08 183 0.14 -0.06 
Performance Disagree 260 0.04 182 0.05 -0.01 
Switched Vendor 260 0.07 183 0.18 -0.11** 
Refused DD question 260 0.13 183 0.15 -0.02 
Can't Verify Assets 260 0.09 183 0.07 0.02 
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Can't Verify Performance 260 0.09 183 0.09 0.00 
Independent Admin 259 0.93 183 0.83 0.10** 
**Significant at the 1% level; *Significant at the 5% level 
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Table III:  Logistic Analysis of Fund Selection 
 
Presented below are results from logistic models analyzing the selection of funds for a 
DD report.  Log Assets is the log of the last assets reported by the fund.  Management Fee 
and Incentive Fee are the funds’ management fee and incentive fee, respectfully.  High 
Water Mark and Leveraged are one if the fund has a high water mark or uses leverage, 
respectfully. Red Notice Period and Lockup Period is the length of notice (in days) 
needed to request money and the length of time (in months) money is locked into the 
fund. Return Mean, Return Std. Dev. and Ret Autocorrelation is the average monthly 
return, monthly return standard deviation and autocorrelation of monthly returns 
respectfully. Big 4 Auditor is one if the fund has a big 4 auditor. Standard errors are 
clustered by fund. 
 
 
 Database Matches  All Funds  
 Coefficient Chi Sq  Coefficient Chi Sq  
Log Assets 0.391 108.07** 0.384 87.86** 
Management Fee 0.285 6.97** 0.416 18.82** 
Incentive Fee 0.047 14.48** 0.054 21.18** 
High Water Mark 0.658 13.15** 0.817 22.14** 
Leveraged 0.048 0.13 0.001 0.00 
Red Notice Period 0.007 10.07** 0.009 23.07** 
Lockup Period -0.037 12.67** -0.043 19.14** 
Return Mean 0.841 144.55** 0.841 147.40** 
Return Std. Dev. -0.472 93.46** -0.492 106.87** 
Ret Autocorrelation 0.300 1.13 -0.075 0.09 
Big 4 Auditor -0.475 13.62** -1.041 80.53** 
      
Year Dummies Y   Y  
Style Dummies Y   Y   
Clustered by Fund Y   Y   
       
Fund Year 
Observations 
26,112   26,203   
Number of Funds 8,999   9,090   
R-Squared 0.26   0.27   
**Significant at the 1% level 
*Significant at the 5% level 
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Table IV: TASS/CISDM funds vs. Non-Database Funds 
DD data is based on 444 due diligence reports from a due diligence company. All data are hand-collected. TASS data is from Tremont TASS, 
Inc. and CISDM is from the Center of … Both datasets are from 2009. In TASS/CISDM represents funds found in either the CISDM or TASS 
database while Not in TASS/CISDM as those not found.  
 
 In TASS/CISDM  Not in TASS/CISDM    
 N Mean Median Stdev  N Mean Median Stdev Diff p-value  
Ret. Mean 313 1.71 1.42 1.23  106 1.57 1.42 1.03 0.14 0.24  
Ret. Stdev 313 2.46 2.05 1.81  104 2.11 1.54 1.81 0.35 0.10  
Ret. Autocorr 298 0.17 0.17 0.22  95 0.09 0.10 0.24 0.08 0.01 ** 
Assets 314 374.87 119.50 827.36  127 394.83 105.00 944.12 -19.96 0.84  
Lawsuit 315 0.32 0.00 0.47  128 0.31 0.00 0.47 0.01 0.92  
Regulatory 315 0.16 0.00 0.37  128 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.02 0.63  
V. Problem 315 0.43 0.00 0.50  128 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.67  
SignaturePB 279 1.72 2.00 0.75  113 1.77 2.00 0.68 -0.05 0.56  
SignatureB 286 1.71 2.00 0.71  118 1.69 2.00 0.71 0.02 0.88  
SignIQ 310 0.23 0.00 0.42  128 0.31 0.00 0.47 -0.08 0.08  
Pricing 315 0.64 1.00 0.48  128 0.66 1.00 0.48 -0.02 0.77  
Big 4 Auditor 315 0.64 1.00 0.48  128 0.59 1.00 0.49 0.05 0.26  
Strategic Liar 315 0.06 0.00 0.24  128 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.97  
Liar 315 0.09 0.00 0.28  128 0.11 0.00 0.31 -0.02 0.46  
Truthteller 315 0.23 0.00 0.42  128 0.23 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.99  
**Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table V:  Relationship between Problems and Operational Risk Variables  
 
This table reports results of a probit model investigating the relationship between 
operational risk variables and problems defined as lawsuits and regulatory issues. Models 
are run with style dummies to control for style effects. Models are run in connection with 
a two-stage Heckman model, where Lambda is the control term. Variables definitions are 
in Appendix A.  
 
 
 Model 1   Model 2  
 coefficient Chi-sq   coefficient Chi-sq  
Return mean 0.193 0.99  0.041 0.03  
Return Std. Dev. 0.033 0.08  0.083 0.40  
Return Autocorr 0.032 0.00  -0.139 0.04  
Log(assets) 0.093 1.03  0.162 2.05  
Fund age 0.032 0.31  0.051 0.59  
Management fee -0.469 2.66  -0.277 0.61  
Incentive fee -0.027 0.85  -0.014 0.17  
Lockup period 0.005 0.05  0.014 0.26  
Notice period 0.002 0.41  -0.002 0.13  
Background Lie 0.027 0.00  0.257 0.15 
Signature IQ -0.023 0.00  -0.169 0.19 
Pricing -0.699 6.82**  -0.904 6.91* 
Big 4 auditor -0.825 7.43**  -0.889 5.14* 
Perf Ver Issue -0.119 0.13  0.115 0.08 
Bad Recall -0.066 0.05  -0.480 1.36 
Oper Ver Issue -0.003 0.00  -0.397 1.02 
Vender Switch 1.292 10.31**  1.565 12.42** 
Refused Question 0.219 0.40  0.450 1.20 
# Ind Board    -0.522 1.11  
Lambda 0.485 1.23  0.243 0.23  
        
Pseudo R-square 0.21    0.27   
Num Obs. 382    290   
**Significant at the 1% level. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table VI:  Relationship between Misrepresentation and Operational Risk Variables  
 
This table reports results of a probit model investigating the relationship between 
operational risk variables and misrepresentation. Models are run with style dummies to 
control for style effects. Models are run in connection with a two-stage Heckman model, 
where Lambda is the control term. Variables definitions are in Appendix A.  
 
 
 Model 1   Model 2  
 coefficient Chi-sq   coefficient Chi-sq  
Return mean 0.266 1.48  0.304 1.49  
Return Std. Dev. -0.186 1.86  -0.181 1.28  
Return Autocorr 0.165 0.06  0.056 0.00  
Log(assets) -0.039 0.14  0.020 0.03  
Fund age 0.010 0.03  0.031 0.23  
Management fee 0.357 1.05  0.552 1.86  
Incentive fee -0.011 0.12  0.010 0.09  
Lockup period 0.007 0.07  -0.016 0.19  
Notice period 0.002 0.20  -0.003 0.28  
Disclosed Issue 0.440 2.02  0.222 0.31  
Signature IQ 0.239 0.35  0.267 0.29 
Pricing -0.474 2.09  -0.371 0.74 
Big 4 auditor -0.556 3.17  -0.834 5.35* 
Perf Ver Issue -0.361 0.84  -0.481 0.89  
Bad Recall -0.441 1.56  -0.760 2.11  
Oper Ver Issue 0.201 0.28  -0.284 0.33  
Vender Switch 0.237 0.31  0.065 0.01  
Refused Question 0.273 0.42  0.749 2.45 
# Ind Board    0.267 0.23  
Lambda 0.300 0.37  0.655 1.27  
      
 
 
Pseudo R-square 0.11    0.13   
Num Obs. 382    290   
**Significant at the 1% level. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table VII:  Relationship between Prior Appraisal Ratio and Operational Risk 
Variables  
 
This table reports results investigating the relationship between operational risk and 
performance prior to the DD report date. The fund’s appraisal ratio is the dependent 
variable. Models are run with style dummies to control for style effects.  Models are run 
in connection with a two-stage Heckman model, where Lambda is the control term. 
Variables definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  
All Lies -0.060 -0.29   -0.100 -0.55 
Some Lies -0.085 -0.47   -0.085 -0.51 
No Lies 0.030 0.15   0.000 0.00 
Log(assets) -0.016 -0.70 -0.016 -0.70 -0.015 -0.67 
Fund age -0.093 -4.94** -0.093 -5.03** -0.100 -5.19** 
Autocorrelation 0.722 1.61 0.729 1.61 0.761 1.66 
Management fee -0.028 -0.31 -0.031 -0.36 -0.028 -0.33 
Incentive fee 0.010 1.57* 0.011 1.66* 0.012 1.95* 
Lockup period 0.008 1.08 0.008 1.05 0.010 1.25 
Notice period 0.004 1.86 0.004 1.90 0.003 1.69 
Pricing -0.087 -0.62 -0.087 -0.68 -0.098 -0.69 
Signature IQ 0.068 0.50 0.065 0.49 0.031 0.23 
Big 4 auditor -0.363 -2.26* -0.360 -2.34* -0.355 -2.22* 
Perf Ver Issue  -0.252 -1.93 -0.234 -2.12*    
Perf Ver w/ MR  -0.410 -1.43 -0.461 -1.73   
Bad Recall 0.005 0.04 0.011 0.09   
Oper Ver Issue 0.187 1.08 0.190 1.10   
Vender Switch -0.155 -1.24  -0.163 -1.33    
Refused Question -0.049 -0.25 -0.054 -0.30   
Lambda 0.097 2.34* 0.099 2.42* 0.074 1.91 
          
Adjusted R-squared 0.20   0.19   0.18   
Num Obs. 417   417   417   
**Significant at the 1% level; *Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table VIII:  Relationship between Future Appraisal Ratio and Operational Risk 
Variables  
 
This table reports results examining the relationship between fund performance after the 
DD report and operational risk. The fund’s appraisal ratio is the dependent variable. 
Models are run with style dummies to control for style effects. Models are run in 
connection with a two-stage Heckman model, where Lambda is the control term. 
Variables definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  
All Lies -0.042 -0.22   0.076 0.55 
Some Lies 0.859 2.36 *   1.002 2.42* 
No Lies -0.149 -1.13   -0.142 -1.28 
Log(assets) -0.054 -1.53 -0.042 -1.17 -0.083 -2.45* 
Fund age -0.028 -1.63 -0.023 -1.46 -0.029 -1.97* 
Autocorrelation -0.172 -0.56 -0.171 -0.53 -0.231 -0.81 
Management fee -0.202 -1.03 -0.222 -1.09  -0.199 -1.00 
Incentive fee 0.016 0.64 0.018 0.72 0.014 0.56 
Lockup period -0.001 -0.19 -0.003 -0.33 -0.003 -0.34 
Notice period 0.006 2.87 ** 0.007 2.73** 0.007 2.85** 
Pricing -0.226 -1.75 -0.225 -1.81 -0.280 -2.04* 
Signature IQ -0.007 -0.05 0.032 0.24   
Big 4 auditor -0.208 -1.45 -0.221 -1.59   
Perf Ver Issue 0.796 0.90 1.150 1.16   
Perf Ver w/ MR -0.023 -0.16 -0.105 -0.83    
Bad Recall -0.134 -1.16 -0.172 -1.48   
Oper Ver Issue 0.107 0.63 0.082 0.46   
Vender Switch 0.197 0.64 0.165 0.56   
Refused Question -0.186 -1.25  -0.223 -1.52    
Lambda 0.107 1.88 0.106 1.80 0.116 1.92 
          
R-squared 0.20   0.16   0.17   
Num Obs. 345   345   352   
**Significant at the 1% level; *Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table IX:  Relationship between Probability of Fund Death and Operational Risk 
Variables  
 
This table reports results of a Cox proportional hazards model investigating the 
relationship between operational risk variables and the length of time to death after the 
DD report. Models are run with style dummies to control for style effects. Models are run 
in connection with a two-stage Heckman model, where Lambda is the control term. 
Variables definitions are in Appendix A.  
 
 Model 1   Model 2  
 coefficient Chi-sq   coefficient Chi-sq  
Return mean 0.199 1.56   0.157 0.94  
Return Std. Dev. -0.312 8.31**  -0.292 7.18* 
Return Autocorr 0.119 0.08  0.130 0.09 
Log(assets) -0.047 0.29  -0.087 0.88 
Fund age 0.046 1.18  0.048 1.26 
Management fee 0.456 3.91*  0.446 3.73 
Incentive fee -0.022 0.88   -0.027 1.22  
Lockup period -0.011 0.50   -0.009 0.29  
Notice period 0.004 0.88   0.003 0.64  
Signature IQ 0.521 5.84*  0.519 5.84* 
Pricing 0.194 0.84  0.257 1.44 
Big 4 auditor -0.160 0.43  -0.055 0.05 
Perf Ver Issue 0.357 1.43   0.424 1.98  
Perf Ver w/ MR 1.504 14.68**  1.388 12.23** 
Bad Recall 0.245 1.05   0.221 0.85  
Oper Ver Issue 0.012 0.00   0.061 0.05  
Vender Switch -0.369 1.35   -0.438 1.88  
Refused Question -0.057 0.04  -0.053 0.04 
Problem    0.324 2.92  
Lambda 0.442 1.34   0.304 0.60  
        
Pseudo R-square 0.03    0.03   
Num Obs. 282    282   
**Significant at the 1% level.; *Significant at the 5% level. 
42 
 
Table X:  Relationship between Future Flows and Operational Risk Variables  
 
This table reports results with examining investor flows after the DD report. The fund’s 
flow as a percentage of prior assets over the 12 months after their DD report is the 
dependent variable. Models are run with style dummies to control for style effects. 
Models are run in connection with a two-stage Heckman model, where Lambda is the 
control term. Variables definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
 All Funds  All Funds  All Funds  
 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  
All Lies 1.363 1.36   1.528 1.56 
Some Lies -0.086 -0.16   0.025 0.05 
No Lies 0.552 1.26   0.499 1.23 
Return Mean 0.357 0.80 0.345 0.75 0.433 0.93 
Return Std. Dev. -0.276 -1.24 -0.281 -1.23 -0.270 -1.23 
Return Autocorr -1.759 -0.76 -1.847 -0.80 -1.464 -0.66 
Log(assets) -0.742 -3.36 ** -0.677 -3.06** -0.758 -3.29** 
Fund age -0.077 -1.53 -0.084 -1.70 -0.056 -1.09 
Management fee -0.110 -0.30 -0.006 -0.02  -0.178 -0.47 
Incentive fee 0.013 0.33 0.005 0.13 0.009 0.23 
Lockup period -0.030 -0.94 -0.023 -0.66 -0.026 -0.82 
Notice period 0.015 1.64 0.013 1.40 0.013 1.53 
Pricing -0.480 -1.09 -0.630 -1.41 -0.518 -1.13 
Signature IQ 0.689 1.08 0.742 1.07 0.696 1.08 
Big 4 auditor 0.337 1.06 0.235 0.75 0.496 1.54 
Perf Ver Issue -0.654 -1.62 -0.475 -1.22   
Bad Recall -0.860 -2.13 * -0.941 -2.39*   
Oper Ver Issue -0.479 -1.12  -0.595 -1.42    
Vender Switch -0.418 -1.02  -0.387 -1.00    
Refused Question 0.302 0.81  0.421 1.24    
Lambda 0.232 0.87  0.196 0.78  0.175 0.65  
R-squared 0.21   0.20   0.19   
Num Obs. 267   267   267   
**Significant at the 1% level.; *Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table XI:  Relationship between Future Flows and Operational Risk Variables 
(DD Funds Only) 
 
This table reports results with examining investor flows after the DD report, but only 
includes funds selected for DD reports. The fund’s flow as a percentage of prior assets 
over the 12 months after their DD report is the dependent variable. Models are run with 
style dummies to control for style effects. Models are run in connection with a two-stage 
Heckman model, where Lambda is the control term. Variables definitions are in 
Appendix A. 
 
 All Funds  All Funds  All Funds  
 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  
All Lies 1.802 1.36   2.037 1.59 
Some Lies 0.249 0.53   0.404 0.87 
No Lies 0.935 1.98 *   0.949 1.98* 
Return Mean -0.489 -1.08 -0.497 -1.03 -0.556 -1.18 
Return Std. Dev. 0.107 0.48 0.125 0.53 0.155 0.69 
Return Autocorr 0.662 0.78 0.473 0.48  0.933 1.07 
Log(assets) -1.032 -3.96 ** -0.927 -3.77** -1.055 -3.76** 
Fund age -0.106 -1.39 -0.128 -1.62 -0.084 -1.20 
Management fee -0.062 -0.20 0.142 0.48  -0.072 -0.26 
Incentive fee 0.026 0.51 0.016 0.32 0.019 0.42 
Lockup period 0.013 0.36 0.018 0.48 0.021 0.57 
Notice period 0.002 0.33 -0.001 -0.15 0.000 0.09 
Pricing -0.226 -0.60 -0.535 -1.22 -0.132 -0.36 
Signature IQ 0.823 1.18 0.874 1.13 0.734 1.07 
Big 4 auditor 0.581 1.64 0.394 1.19 0.697 1.85 
Perf Ver Issue -0.384 -0.91 -0.140 -0.35 -0.925 -1.55 
Bad Recall -0.920 -2.32 * -1.075 -2.55*   
Oper Ver Issue -0.025 -0.06  -0.202 -0.51    
Vender Switch -0.392 -0.93  -0.465 -1.18    
Refused Question 0.599 1.30  0.728 1.80    
Lambda -0.545 -0.89  -0.471 -0.77  2.037 1.59  
R-squared 0.31   0.27   0.29   
Num Obs. 197   197   197   
**Significant at the 1% level.; *Significant at the 5% level. 
44 
 
 
Table XII:  Comparison of Flows and Appraisal Ratios after DD Report  
 
This tables reports results comparing the flows and appraisal ratios of funds selected for 
DD reports and other matched funds from the TASS database. Funds for the appraisal 
ratio results were matched by age, size and prior appraisal ratio while match funds for the 
flow results were selected by age, assets and return performance over the prior period. 
Results for all DD funds, problem funds and non-problem funds are reported as well as p-
values for the difference. 
 
 DD Funds Non-DD 
Matched Funds 
Difference p-value 
Flows 1.483 0.632 0.851 0.00 
Problem Flows 1.675 0.736 0.939 0.00 
Non-Pro Flows 1.277 0.521 0.756 0.00 
     
Arratio 0.212 0.137 0.074 0.31 
Problem 
Arratio 
0.244 0.183 0.060 0.64 
Non-Pro 
Arratio 
0.181 0.094 0.087 0.22 
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Appendix A: Data Definitions 
Data is from a due diligence company. There are 445 funds. All data are hand-collected.  
 
Performance  
Avg. Returns Average Monthly Return in percent 
Return Std. Dev. Avg, Return standard deviation 
Autocorrelation Avg, Return autocorrelation 
Fund Properties  
Management fee (%) Fund’s management fee in percent 
Incentive fee (%) Fund’s incentive fee in percent 
High Water Mark 1 if the fund has a high water mark and zero otherwise 
Redemption period Number of days between redemption opportunities 
Lockup period Number of days new money is locked into fund 
Notice period Number of days request for a redemption notice 
Time to get cash Number of days to get cash from fund after redemption 
Holding Period Average length of time a position is held, in years 
AUM (Millions of $) Assets under management at DD report time 
Log(assets) Log of assets in US Dollars 
Fund age Age of fund in years 
Manager Characteristics  
Manager age Manager’s age in years 
Manager experience Number of years experience in this area in years 
Manager degree Manager’s education (0=Bachelors or lower, 
1=masters/MBA, 2=Ph.D./MD/Advanced Law) 
Manager property Value of real estate property in millions of dollars 
Operations  
Pricing Priced completely externally = 1, mixed or internal = 0 
Signature: bank # of signatures required to move money from bank 
Signature: prime broker # of signatures required to move money from prime broker 
Signature: IQ  1 if signature controls are institutional quality, zero otherwise 
Big4Auditor 1 if fund’s auditor is a big 4 auditor, zero otherwise 
Money Restrictions 1 if restrictions on where money can be sent from Bank/PB 
Transparency no position transparency=0, partial=1, full=2 
NAV restate 1 if fund has restated NAV in the past 
Staff departure # of persons that have departed the fund 
% of board Ind. % of board members that are independent 
Background Issues  
Problem 1 if fund has a lawsuit or regulatory problem, 0 otherwise 
Lawsuit 1 if fund has a lawsuit, 0 otherwise 
Regulatory 1 if fund has a regulatory issue, 0 otherwise 
Misrepresentation 1 if managers failed to disclose past regulatory or legal issue 
Noted Ver Problem 1 if DD company had a problem verifying information This 
includes significant differences between performance/assets 
and operational rules and failing to disclose prior problems  
 
  
 1 
 
Lying Information  
Strategic Liar Fund voluntarily discloses a problem, but does not disclose all 
problems. 
Liar Fund discloses no problems, but has problems. 
Truthteller Fund discloses all problems. 
Regulatory Lie Did not disclose all regulatory infractions 
Lawsuit Lie Did not disclose all lawsuits 
Legal Lie Did not disclose all legal problems 
Background Lie Misrepresented personal background information 
  
Background Issues  
Signature Disagreement Signature process to move money disagreed between fund and 
administrator 
Pricing Disagreement Process to price the portfolio disagreed between fund, 
administrator and/or auditor. 
Bad Recall Fund verbally said something incorrect during DD visit. 
Assets Disagree Asset information disagrees between fund, administrator 
and/or auditor 
Performance Disagree Performance information disagrees between fund, 
administrator and/or auditor 
Switched Vendor Fund switched the vendor of a major process in the last three 
years. 
Refused DD Question Fund and/or administrator refused to answer a DD question 
Can’t Verify Assets DD company cannot independently verify asset information 
Can’t Verify Performance DD company cannot independently verify performance 
information 
Perf Ver Problem 1 if Assets Disagree, Performance Disagree, Can’t Verify 
Assets or Can’t Verify Performance =1 and misrepresentation 
is 0 
Perf Ver Problem w/ MR 1 if Assets Disagree, Performance Disagree, Can’t Verify 
Assets or Can’t Verify Performance =1 and misrepresentation 
is 1 
 
